| What: /sys/kernel/security/*/ima/policy | |
| Date: May 2008 | |
| Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | |
| Description: | |
| The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity | |
| Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash | |
| values of executables and other sensitive system files | |
| loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime, | |
| the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data. | |
| Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy | |
| by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and | |
| then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after | |
| the file ima/policy is closed. | |
| IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements | |
| for local measurement appraisal. | |
| :: | |
| rule format: action [condition ...] | |
| action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | | |
| audit | dont_audit | hash | dont_hash | |
| condition:= base | lsm [option] | |
| base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [fsname=] | |
| [fs_subtype=] | |
| [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=] | |
| [fowner=] [fgroup=]] | |
| lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] | |
| [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] | |
| option: [digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio] | |
| [appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=] | |
| [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=] | |
| base: | |
| func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] | |
| [FIRMWARE_CHECK] | |
| [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] | |
| [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] | |
| [SETXATTR_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT] | |
| mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] | |
| [[^]MAY_EXEC] | |
| fsmagic:= hex value | |
| fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6) | |
| uid:= decimal value | |
| euid:= decimal value | |
| gid:= decimal value | |
| egid:= decimal value | |
| fowner:= decimal value | |
| fgroup:= decimal value | |
| lsm: are LSM specific | |
| option: | |
| appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3] | |
| where 'imasig' is the original or the signature | |
| format v2. | |
| where 'modsig' is an appended signature, | |
| where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. | |
| appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist] (deprecated) | |
| Setting the check_blacklist flag is no longer necessary. | |
| All appraisal functions set it by default. | |
| digest_type:= verity | |
| Require fs-verity's file digest instead of the | |
| regular IMA file hash. | |
| keyrings:= list of keyrings | |
| (eg, .builtin_trusted_keys|.ima). Only valid | |
| when action is "measure" and func is KEY_CHECK. | |
| template:= name of a defined IMA template type | |
| (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". | |
| pcr:= decimal value | |
| label:= [selinux]|[kernel_info]|[data_label] | |
| data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. | |
| For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux. | |
| appraise_algos:= comma-separated list of hash algorithms | |
| For example, "sha256,sha512" to only accept to appraise | |
| files where the security.ima xattr was hashed with one | |
| of these two algorithms. | |
| default policy: | |
| # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0 | |
| # SYSFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572 | |
| # DEBUGFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720 | |
| # TMPFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994 | |
| # RAMFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6 | |
| # DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1 | |
| # BINFMTFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d | |
| # SECURITYFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673 | |
| # SELINUX_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c | |
| # CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb | |
| # NSFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673 | |
| # CONFIGFS_MAGIC | |
| dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656570 | |
| dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656570 | |
| measure func=BPRM_CHECK | |
| measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC | |
| measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 | |
| measure func=MODULE_CHECK | |
| measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK | |
| appraise fowner=0 | |
| The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, | |
| all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files | |
| open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal | |
| policy appraises all files owned by root. | |
| Examples of LSM specific definitions: | |
| SELinux:: | |
| dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t | |
| dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t | |
| dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t | |
| dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t | |
| measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ | |
| measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ | |
| Smack:: | |
| measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ | |
| Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs:: | |
| measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4 | |
| measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5 | |
| Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures: | |
| appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig | |
| Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to measure all keys: | |
| measure func=KEY_CHECK | |
| Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to only measure | |
| keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: | |
| measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima | |
| Example of the special SETXATTR_CHECK appraise rule, that | |
| restricts the hash algorithms allowed when writing to the | |
| security.ima xattr of a file: | |
| appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512 | |
| Example of a 'measure' rule requiring fs-verity's digests | |
| with indication of type of digest in the measurement list. | |
| measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity \ | |
| template=ima-ngv2 | |
| Example of 'measure' and 'appraise' rules requiring fs-verity | |
| signatures (format version 3) stored in security.ima xattr. | |
| The 'measure' rule specifies the 'ima-sigv3' template option, | |
| which includes the indication of type of digest and the file | |
| signature in the measurement list. | |
| measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \ | |
| template=ima-sigv3 | |
| The 'appraise' rule specifies the type and signature format | |
| version (sigv3) required. | |
| appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \ | |
| appraise_type=sigv3 | |
| Example of a regular IMA file hash 'appraise' rule requiring | |
| signature version 3 format stored in security.ima xattr. | |
| appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3 | |
| All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained | |
| either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM | |
| labels. |