| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| /* | |
| * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest driver interface | |
| * | |
| * Copyright (C) 2021-2024 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. | |
| * | |
| * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| #include <linux/types.h> | |
| #include <linux/mutex.h> | |
| #include <linux/io.h> | |
| #include <linux/platform_device.h> | |
| #include <linux/miscdevice.h> | |
| #include <linux/set_memory.h> | |
| #include <linux/fs.h> | |
| #include <linux/tsm.h> | |
| #include <linux/psp-sev.h> | |
| #include <linux/sockptr.h> | |
| #include <linux/cleanup.h> | |
| #include <linux/uuid.h> | |
| #include <linux/configfs.h> | |
| #include <linux/mm.h> | |
| #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h> | |
| #include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h> | |
| #include <asm/svm.h> | |
| #include <asm/sev.h> | |
| #define DEVICE_NAME "sev-guest" | |
| #define SVSM_MAX_RETRIES 3 | |
| struct snp_guest_dev { | |
| struct device *dev; | |
| struct miscdevice misc; | |
| struct snp_msg_desc *msg_desc; | |
| }; | |
| /* | |
| * The VMPCK ID represents the key used by the SNP guest to communicate with the | |
| * SEV firmware in the AMD Secure Processor (ASP, aka PSP). By default, the key | |
| * used will be the key associated with the VMPL at which the guest is running. | |
| * Should the default key be wiped (see snp_disable_vmpck()), this parameter | |
| * allows for using one of the remaining VMPCKs. | |
| */ | |
| static int vmpck_id = -1; | |
| module_param(vmpck_id, int, 0444); | |
| MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP."); | |
| static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file) | |
| { | |
| struct miscdevice *dev = file->private_data; | |
| return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc); | |
| } | |
| struct snp_req_resp { | |
| sockptr_t req_data; | |
| sockptr_t resp_data; | |
| }; | |
| static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg) | |
| { | |
| struct snp_report_req *report_req __free(kfree) = NULL; | |
| struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc; | |
| struct snp_report_resp *report_resp; | |
| struct snp_guest_req req = {}; | |
| int rc, resp_len; | |
| if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| report_req = kzalloc_obj(*report_req, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| if (!report_req) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| if (copy_from_user(report_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*report_req))) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| /* | |
| * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the | |
| * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the | |
| * authtag. | |
| */ | |
| resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + AUTHTAG_LEN; | |
| report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| if (!report_resp) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; | |
| req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; | |
| req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id; | |
| req.req_buf = report_req; | |
| req.req_sz = sizeof(*report_req); | |
| req.resp_buf = report_resp->data; | |
| req.resp_sz = resp_len; | |
| req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; | |
| rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req); | |
| arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2; | |
| if (rc) | |
| goto e_free; | |
| if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp))) | |
| rc = -EFAULT; | |
| e_free: | |
| kfree(report_resp); | |
| return rc; | |
| } | |
| static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg) | |
| { | |
| struct snp_derived_key_resp *derived_key_resp __free(kfree) = NULL; | |
| struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req __free(kfree) = NULL; | |
| struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc; | |
| struct snp_guest_req req = {}; | |
| int rc, resp_len; | |
| if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| /* | |
| * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the | |
| * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the | |
| * authtag. | |
| */ | |
| resp_len = sizeof(derived_key_resp->data) + AUTHTAG_LEN; | |
| derived_key_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| if (!derived_key_resp) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| derived_key_req = kzalloc_obj(*derived_key_req, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| if (!derived_key_req) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| if (copy_from_user(derived_key_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, | |
| sizeof(*derived_key_req))) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; | |
| req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ; | |
| req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id; | |
| req.req_buf = derived_key_req; | |
| req.req_sz = sizeof(*derived_key_req); | |
| req.resp_buf = derived_key_resp; | |
| req.resp_sz = resp_len; | |
| req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; | |
| rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req); | |
| arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2; | |
| if (!rc) { | |
| if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, derived_key_resp, | |
| sizeof(derived_key_resp->data))) | |
| rc = -EFAULT; | |
| } | |
| /* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */ | |
| memzero_explicit(derived_key_resp, sizeof(*derived_key_resp)); | |
| return rc; | |
| } | |
| static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg, | |
| struct snp_req_resp *io) | |
| { | |
| struct snp_ext_report_req *report_req __free(kfree) = NULL; | |
| struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc; | |
| struct snp_report_resp *report_resp; | |
| struct snp_guest_req req = {}; | |
| int ret, npages = 0, resp_len; | |
| sockptr_t certs_address; | |
| u64 pfn; | |
| if (sockptr_is_null(io->req_data) || sockptr_is_null(io->resp_data)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| report_req = kzalloc_obj(*report_req, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| if (!report_req) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| if (copy_from_sockptr(report_req, io->req_data, sizeof(*report_req))) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| /* caller does not want certificate data */ | |
| if (!report_req->certs_len || !report_req->certs_address) | |
| goto cmd; | |
| if (report_req->certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE || | |
| !IS_ALIGNED(report_req->certs_len, PAGE_SIZE)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| if (sockptr_is_kernel(io->resp_data)) { | |
| certs_address = KERNEL_SOCKPTR((void *)report_req->certs_address); | |
| } else { | |
| certs_address = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)report_req->certs_address); | |
| if (!access_ok(certs_address.user, report_req->certs_len)) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Initialize the intermediate buffer with all zeros. This buffer | |
| * is used in the guest request message to get the certs blob from | |
| * the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy | |
| * zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided. | |
| */ | |
| npages = report_req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT; | |
| req.certs_data = alloc_pages_exact(npages << PAGE_SHIFT, | |
| GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); | |
| if (!req.certs_data) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| pfn = PHYS_PFN(virt_to_phys(req.certs_data)); | |
| ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)req.certs_data, npages); | |
| if (ret) { | |
| pr_err("failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret); | |
| snp_leak_pages(pfn, npages); | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| } | |
| cmd: | |
| /* | |
| * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the | |
| * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the | |
| * authtag. | |
| */ | |
| resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + AUTHTAG_LEN; | |
| report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| if (!report_resp) { | |
| ret = -ENOMEM; | |
| goto e_free_data; | |
| } | |
| req.input.data_npages = npages; | |
| req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; | |
| req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; | |
| req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id; | |
| req.req_buf = &report_req->data; | |
| req.req_sz = sizeof(report_req->data); | |
| req.resp_buf = report_resp->data; | |
| req.resp_sz = resp_len; | |
| req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST; | |
| ret = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req); | |
| arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2; | |
| /* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */ | |
| if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) { | |
| report_req->certs_len = req.input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT; | |
| if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, report_req, sizeof(*report_req))) | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| } | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto e_free; | |
| if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, req.certs_data, report_req->certs_len)) { | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| goto e_free; | |
| } | |
| if (copy_to_sockptr(io->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp))) | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| e_free: | |
| kfree(report_resp); | |
| e_free_data: | |
| if (npages) { | |
| if (set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)req.certs_data, npages)) { | |
| WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n"); | |
| snp_leak_pages(pfn, npages); | |
| } else { | |
| free_pages_exact(req.certs_data, npages << PAGE_SHIFT); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) | |
| { | |
| struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = to_snp_dev(file); | |
| void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg; | |
| struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input; | |
| struct snp_req_resp io; | |
| int ret = -ENOTTY; | |
| if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(input))) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| input.exitinfo2 = 0xff; | |
| /* Message version must be non-zero */ | |
| if (!input.msg_version) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| switch (ioctl) { | |
| case SNP_GET_REPORT: | |
| ret = get_report(snp_dev, &input); | |
| break; | |
| case SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY: | |
| ret = get_derived_key(snp_dev, &input); | |
| break; | |
| case SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT: | |
| /* | |
| * As get_ext_report() may be called from the ioctl() path and a | |
| * kernel internal path (configfs-tsm), decorate the passed | |
| * buffers as user pointers. | |
| */ | |
| io.req_data = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)input.req_data); | |
| io.resp_data = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)input.resp_data); | |
| ret = get_ext_report(snp_dev, &input, &io); | |
| break; | |
| default: | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| if (input.exitinfo2 && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input))) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = { | |
| .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
| .unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl, | |
| }; | |
| struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr { | |
| u32 status; | |
| u32 report_size; | |
| u8 rsvd[24]; | |
| }; | |
| struct snp_msg_cert_entry { | |
| guid_t guid; | |
| u32 offset; | |
| u32 length; | |
| }; | |
| static int sev_svsm_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int rep_len, man_len, certs_len; | |
| struct tsm_report_desc *desc = &report->desc; | |
| struct svsm_attest_call ac = {}; | |
| unsigned int retry_count; | |
| void *rep, *man, *certs; | |
| struct svsm_call call; | |
| unsigned int size; | |
| bool try_again; | |
| void *buffer; | |
| u64 call_id; | |
| int ret; | |
| /* | |
| * Allocate pages for the request: | |
| * - Report blob (4K) | |
| * - Manifest blob (4K) | |
| * - Certificate blob (16K) | |
| * | |
| * Above addresses must be 4K aligned | |
| */ | |
| rep_len = SZ_4K; | |
| man_len = SZ_4K; | |
| certs_len = SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE; | |
| if (guid_is_null(&desc->service_guid)) { | |
| call_id = SVSM_ATTEST_CALL(SVSM_ATTEST_SERVICES); | |
| } else { | |
| export_guid(ac.service_guid, &desc->service_guid); | |
| ac.service_manifest_ver = desc->service_manifest_version; | |
| call_id = SVSM_ATTEST_CALL(SVSM_ATTEST_SINGLE_SERVICE); | |
| } | |
| retry_count = 0; | |
| retry: | |
| memset(&call, 0, sizeof(call)); | |
| size = rep_len + man_len + certs_len; | |
| buffer = alloc_pages_exact(size, __GFP_ZERO); | |
| if (!buffer) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| rep = buffer; | |
| ac.report_buf.pa = __pa(rep); | |
| ac.report_buf.len = rep_len; | |
| man = rep + rep_len; | |
| ac.manifest_buf.pa = __pa(man); | |
| ac.manifest_buf.len = man_len; | |
| certs = man + man_len; | |
| ac.certificates_buf.pa = __pa(certs); | |
| ac.certificates_buf.len = certs_len; | |
| ac.nonce.pa = __pa(desc->inblob); | |
| ac.nonce.len = desc->inblob_len; | |
| ret = snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(call_id, &call, &ac); | |
| if (ret) { | |
| free_pages_exact(buffer, size); | |
| switch (call.rax_out) { | |
| case SVSM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER: | |
| try_again = false; | |
| if (ac.report_buf.len > rep_len) { | |
| rep_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ac.report_buf.len); | |
| try_again = true; | |
| } | |
| if (ac.manifest_buf.len > man_len) { | |
| man_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ac.manifest_buf.len); | |
| try_again = true; | |
| } | |
| if (ac.certificates_buf.len > certs_len) { | |
| certs_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ac.certificates_buf.len); | |
| try_again = true; | |
| } | |
| /* If one of the buffers wasn't large enough, retry the request */ | |
| if (try_again && retry_count < SVSM_MAX_RETRIES) { | |
| retry_count++; | |
| goto retry; | |
| } | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| default: | |
| pr_err_ratelimited("SVSM attestation request failed (%d / 0x%llx)\n", | |
| ret, call.rax_out); | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Allocate all the blob memory buffers at once so that the cleanup is | |
| * done for errors that occur after the first allocation (i.e. before | |
| * using no_free_ptr()). | |
| */ | |
| rep_len = ac.report_buf.len; | |
| void *rbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(rep_len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| man_len = ac.manifest_buf.len; | |
| void *mbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(man_len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| certs_len = ac.certificates_buf.len; | |
| void *cbuf __free(kvfree) = certs_len ? kvzalloc(certs_len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL; | |
| if (!rbuf || !mbuf || (certs_len && !cbuf)) { | |
| free_pages_exact(buffer, size); | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(rbuf, rep, rep_len); | |
| report->outblob = no_free_ptr(rbuf); | |
| report->outblob_len = rep_len; | |
| memcpy(mbuf, man, man_len); | |
| report->manifestblob = no_free_ptr(mbuf); | |
| report->manifestblob_len = man_len; | |
| if (certs_len) { | |
| memcpy(cbuf, certs, certs_len); | |
| report->auxblob = no_free_ptr(cbuf); | |
| report->auxblob_len = certs_len; | |
| } | |
| free_pages_exact(buffer, size); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int sev_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data) | |
| { | |
| struct snp_msg_cert_entry *cert_table; | |
| struct tsm_report_desc *desc = &report->desc; | |
| struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = data; | |
| struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr hdr; | |
| const u32 report_size = SZ_4K; | |
| const u32 ext_size = SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE; | |
| u32 certs_size, i, size = report_size + ext_size; | |
| int ret; | |
| if (desc->inblob_len != SNP_REPORT_USER_DATA_SIZE) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| if (desc->service_provider) { | |
| if (strcmp(desc->service_provider, "svsm")) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| return sev_svsm_report_new(report, data); | |
| } | |
| void *buf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!buf) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| cert_table = buf + report_size; | |
| struct snp_ext_report_req ext_req = { | |
| .data = { .vmpl = desc->privlevel }, | |
| .certs_address = (__u64)cert_table, | |
| .certs_len = ext_size, | |
| }; | |
| memcpy(&ext_req.data.user_data, desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len); | |
| struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input = { | |
| .msg_version = 1, | |
| .req_data = (__u64)&ext_req, | |
| .resp_data = (__u64)buf, | |
| .exitinfo2 = 0xff, | |
| }; | |
| struct snp_req_resp io = { | |
| .req_data = KERNEL_SOCKPTR(&ext_req), | |
| .resp_data = KERNEL_SOCKPTR(buf), | |
| }; | |
| ret = get_ext_report(snp_dev, &input, &io); | |
| if (ret) | |
| return ret; | |
| memcpy(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)); | |
| if (hdr.status == SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| if (hdr.status == SEV_RET_INVALID_KEY) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| if (hdr.status) | |
| return -ENXIO; | |
| if ((hdr.report_size + sizeof(hdr)) > report_size) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| void *rbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(hdr.report_size, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!rbuf) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| memcpy(rbuf, buf + sizeof(hdr), hdr.report_size); | |
| report->outblob = no_free_ptr(rbuf); | |
| report->outblob_len = hdr.report_size; | |
| certs_size = 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < ext_size / sizeof(struct snp_msg_cert_entry); i++) { | |
| struct snp_msg_cert_entry *ent = &cert_table[i]; | |
| if (guid_is_null(&ent->guid) && !ent->offset && !ent->length) | |
| break; | |
| certs_size = max(certs_size, ent->offset + ent->length); | |
| } | |
| /* Suspicious that the response populated entries without populating size */ | |
| if (!certs_size && i) | |
| dev_warn_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "certificate slots conveyed without size\n"); | |
| /* No certs to report */ | |
| if (!certs_size) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Suspicious that the certificate blob size contract was violated | |
| */ | |
| if (certs_size > ext_size) { | |
| dev_warn_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "certificate data truncated\n"); | |
| certs_size = ext_size; | |
| } | |
| void *cbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(certs_size, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!cbuf) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| memcpy(cbuf, cert_table, certs_size); | |
| report->auxblob = no_free_ptr(cbuf); | |
| report->auxblob_len = certs_size; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static bool sev_report_attr_visible(int n) | |
| { | |
| switch (n) { | |
| case TSM_REPORT_GENERATION: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_PROVIDER: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_PRIVLEVEL_FLOOR: | |
| return true; | |
| case TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_PROVIDER: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_GUID: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_SERVICE_MANIFEST_VER: | |
| return snp_vmpl; | |
| } | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| static bool sev_report_bin_attr_visible(int n) | |
| { | |
| switch (n) { | |
| case TSM_REPORT_INBLOB: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_OUTBLOB: | |
| case TSM_REPORT_AUXBLOB: | |
| return true; | |
| case TSM_REPORT_MANIFESTBLOB: | |
| return snp_vmpl; | |
| } | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| static struct tsm_report_ops sev_tsm_report_ops = { | |
| .name = KBUILD_MODNAME, | |
| .report_new = sev_report_new, | |
| .report_attr_visible = sev_report_attr_visible, | |
| .report_bin_attr_visible = sev_report_bin_attr_visible, | |
| }; | |
| static void unregister_sev_tsm(void *data) | |
| { | |
| tsm_report_unregister(&sev_tsm_report_ops); | |
| } | |
| static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) | |
| { | |
| struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; | |
| struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev; | |
| struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc; | |
| struct miscdevice *misc; | |
| int ret; | |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE); | |
| if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) | |
| return -ENODEV; | |
| snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!snp_dev) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| mdesc = snp_msg_alloc(); | |
| if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc)) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| ret = snp_msg_init(mdesc, vmpck_id); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto e_msg_init; | |
| platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev); | |
| snp_dev->dev = dev; | |
| misc = &snp_dev->misc; | |
| misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR; | |
| misc->name = DEVICE_NAME; | |
| misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops; | |
| /* Set the privlevel_floor attribute based on the vmpck_id */ | |
| sev_tsm_report_ops.privlevel_floor = mdesc->vmpck_id; | |
| ret = tsm_report_register(&sev_tsm_report_ops, snp_dev); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto e_msg_init; | |
| ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&pdev->dev, unregister_sev_tsm, NULL); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto e_msg_init; | |
| ret = misc_register(misc); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto e_msg_init; | |
| snp_dev->msg_desc = mdesc; | |
| dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using VMPCK%d communication key)\n", | |
| mdesc->vmpck_id); | |
| return 0; | |
| e_msg_init: | |
| snp_msg_free(mdesc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static void __exit sev_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) | |
| { | |
| struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); | |
| snp_msg_free(snp_dev->msg_desc); | |
| misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * This driver is meant to be a common SEV guest interface driver and to | |
| * support any SEV guest API. As such, even though it has been introduced | |
| * with the SEV-SNP support, it is named "sev-guest". | |
| * | |
| * sev_guest_remove() lives in .exit.text. For drivers registered via | |
| * module_platform_driver_probe() this is ok because they cannot get unbound | |
| * at runtime. So mark the driver struct with __refdata to prevent modpost | |
| * triggering a section mismatch warning. | |
| */ | |
| static struct platform_driver sev_guest_driver __refdata = { | |
| .remove = __exit_p(sev_guest_remove), | |
| .driver = { | |
| .name = "sev-guest", | |
| }, | |
| }; | |
| module_platform_driver_probe(sev_guest_driver, sev_guest_probe); | |
| MODULE_AUTHOR("Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>"); | |
| MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | |
| MODULE_VERSION("1.0.0"); | |
| MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AMD SEV Guest Driver"); | |
| MODULE_ALIAS("platform:sev-guest"); |