| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| /* | |
| * Copyright (c) 2015 Markus Stockhausen <stockhausen@collogia.de> | |
| * Copyright (C) 2015 International Business Machines Inc. | |
| * Copyright 2026 Google LLC | |
| */ | |
| #include <asm/simd.h> | |
| #include <asm/switch_to.h> | |
| #include <linux/cpufeature.h> | |
| #include <linux/jump_label.h> | |
| #include <linux/preempt.h> | |
| #include <linux/uaccess.h> | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SPE | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_expand_key_128); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_expand_key_192); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_expand_key_256); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_generate_decrypt_key); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_encrypt_ecb); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_decrypt_ecb); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_encrypt_cbc); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_decrypt_cbc); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_crypt_ctr); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_encrypt_xts); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ppc_decrypt_xts); | |
| void ppc_encrypt_aes(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u32 *key_enc, u32 rounds); | |
| void ppc_decrypt_aes(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u32 *key_dec, u32 rounds); | |
| static void spe_begin(void) | |
| { | |
| /* disable preemption and save users SPE registers if required */ | |
| preempt_disable(); | |
| enable_kernel_spe(); | |
| } | |
| static void spe_end(void) | |
| { | |
| disable_kernel_spe(); | |
| /* reenable preemption */ | |
| preempt_enable(); | |
| } | |
| static void aes_preparekey_arch(union aes_enckey_arch *k, | |
| union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k, | |
| const u8 *in_key, int key_len, int nrounds) | |
| { | |
| if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) | |
| ppc_expand_key_128(k->spe_enc_key, in_key); | |
| else if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_192) | |
| ppc_expand_key_192(k->spe_enc_key, in_key); | |
| else | |
| ppc_expand_key_256(k->spe_enc_key, in_key); | |
| if (inv_k) | |
| ppc_generate_decrypt_key(inv_k->spe_dec_key, k->spe_enc_key, | |
| key_len); | |
| } | |
| static void aes_encrypt_arch(const struct aes_enckey *key, | |
| u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], | |
| const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) | |
| { | |
| spe_begin(); | |
| ppc_encrypt_aes(out, in, key->k.spe_enc_key, key->nrounds / 2 - 1); | |
| spe_end(); | |
| } | |
| static void aes_decrypt_arch(const struct aes_key *key, | |
| u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], | |
| const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) | |
| { | |
| spe_begin(); | |
| ppc_decrypt_aes(out, in, key->inv_k.spe_dec_key, key->nrounds / 2 - 1); | |
| spe_end(); | |
| } | |
| #else /* CONFIG_SPE */ | |
| static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_vec_crypto); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_set_encrypt_key); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_set_decrypt_key); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_encrypt); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_decrypt); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_cbc_encrypt); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_xts_encrypt); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_p8_xts_decrypt); | |
| static inline bool is_vsx_format(const struct p8_aes_key *key) | |
| { | |
| return key->nrounds != 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Convert a round key from VSX to generic format by reflecting all 16 bytes (if | |
| * little endian) or reflecting the bytes in each 4-byte word (if big endian), | |
| * and (if apply_inv_mix=true) applying InvMixColumn to each column. | |
| * | |
| * It would be nice if the VSX and generic key formats would be compatible. But | |
| * that's very difficult to do, with the assembly code having been borrowed from | |
| * OpenSSL and also targeted to POWER8 rather than POWER9. | |
| * | |
| * Fortunately, this conversion should only be needed in extremely rare cases, | |
| * possibly not at all in practice. It's just included for full correctness. | |
| */ | |
| static void rndkey_from_vsx(u32 out[4], const u32 in[4], bool apply_inv_mix) | |
| { | |
| const bool be = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN); | |
| u32 k0 = swab32(in[0]); | |
| u32 k1 = swab32(in[1]); | |
| u32 k2 = swab32(in[2]); | |
| u32 k3 = swab32(in[3]); | |
| if (apply_inv_mix) { | |
| k0 = inv_mix_columns(k0); | |
| k1 = inv_mix_columns(k1); | |
| k2 = inv_mix_columns(k2); | |
| k3 = inv_mix_columns(k3); | |
| } | |
| out[0] = be ? k0 : k3; | |
| out[1] = be ? k1 : k2; | |
| out[2] = be ? k2 : k1; | |
| out[3] = be ? k3 : k0; | |
| } | |
| static void aes_preparekey_arch(union aes_enckey_arch *k, | |
| union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k, | |
| const u8 *in_key, int key_len, int nrounds) | |
| { | |
| const int keybits = 8 * key_len; | |
| int ret; | |
| if (static_branch_likely(&have_vec_crypto) && likely(may_use_simd())) { | |
| preempt_disable(); | |
| pagefault_disable(); | |
| enable_kernel_vsx(); | |
| ret = aes_p8_set_encrypt_key(in_key, keybits, &k->p8); | |
| /* | |
| * aes_p8_set_encrypt_key() should never fail here, since the | |
| * key length was already validated. | |
| */ | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); | |
| if (inv_k) { | |
| ret = aes_p8_set_decrypt_key(in_key, keybits, | |
| &inv_k->p8); | |
| /* ... and likewise for aes_p8_set_decrypt_key(). */ | |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); | |
| } | |
| disable_kernel_vsx(); | |
| pagefault_enable(); | |
| preempt_enable(); | |
| } else { | |
| aes_expandkey_generic(k->rndkeys, | |
| inv_k ? inv_k->inv_rndkeys : NULL, | |
| in_key, key_len); | |
| /* Mark the key as using the generic format. */ | |
| k->p8.nrounds = 0; | |
| if (inv_k) | |
| inv_k->p8.nrounds = 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static void aes_encrypt_arch(const struct aes_enckey *key, | |
| u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], | |
| const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) | |
| { | |
| if (static_branch_likely(&have_vec_crypto) && | |
| likely(is_vsx_format(&key->k.p8) && may_use_simd())) { | |
| preempt_disable(); | |
| pagefault_disable(); | |
| enable_kernel_vsx(); | |
| aes_p8_encrypt(in, out, &key->k.p8); | |
| disable_kernel_vsx(); | |
| pagefault_enable(); | |
| preempt_enable(); | |
| } else if (unlikely(is_vsx_format(&key->k.p8))) { | |
| /* | |
| * This handles (the hopefully extremely rare) case where a key | |
| * was prepared using the VSX optimized format, then encryption | |
| * is done in a context that cannot use VSX instructions. | |
| */ | |
| u32 rndkeys[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < 4 * (key->nrounds + 1); i += 4) | |
| rndkey_from_vsx(&rndkeys[i], | |
| &key->k.p8.rndkeys[i], false); | |
| aes_encrypt_generic(rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in); | |
| } else { | |
| aes_encrypt_generic(key->k.rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static void aes_decrypt_arch(const struct aes_key *key, u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], | |
| const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) | |
| { | |
| if (static_branch_likely(&have_vec_crypto) && | |
| likely(is_vsx_format(&key->inv_k.p8) && may_use_simd())) { | |
| preempt_disable(); | |
| pagefault_disable(); | |
| enable_kernel_vsx(); | |
| aes_p8_decrypt(in, out, &key->inv_k.p8); | |
| disable_kernel_vsx(); | |
| pagefault_enable(); | |
| preempt_enable(); | |
| } else if (unlikely(is_vsx_format(&key->inv_k.p8))) { | |
| /* | |
| * This handles (the hopefully extremely rare) case where a key | |
| * was prepared using the VSX optimized format, then decryption | |
| * is done in a context that cannot use VSX instructions. | |
| */ | |
| u32 inv_rndkeys[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]; | |
| int i; | |
| rndkey_from_vsx(&inv_rndkeys[0], | |
| &key->inv_k.p8.rndkeys[0], false); | |
| for (i = 4; i < 4 * key->nrounds; i += 4) { | |
| rndkey_from_vsx(&inv_rndkeys[i], | |
| &key->inv_k.p8.rndkeys[i], true); | |
| } | |
| rndkey_from_vsx(&inv_rndkeys[i], | |
| &key->inv_k.p8.rndkeys[i], false); | |
| aes_decrypt_generic(inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in); | |
| } else { | |
| aes_decrypt_generic(key->inv_k.inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds, | |
| out, in); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| #define aes_mod_init_arch aes_mod_init_arch | |
| static void aes_mod_init_arch(void) | |
| { | |
| if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) && | |
| (cur_cpu_spec->cpu_user_features2 & PPC_FEATURE2_VEC_CRYPTO)) | |
| static_branch_enable(&have_vec_crypto); | |
| } | |
| #endif /* !CONFIG_SPE */ |