| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later | |
| /* | |
| * algif_aead: User-space interface for AEAD algorithms | |
| * | |
| * Copyright (C) 2014, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> | |
| * | |
| * This file provides the user-space API for AEAD ciphers. | |
| * | |
| * The following concept of the memory management is used: | |
| * | |
| * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is | |
| * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg. Filling up the TX | |
| * SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be tracked by the | |
| * kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must provide a buffer | |
| * which is tracked with the RX SGL. | |
| * | |
| * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is | |
| * allocated and prepared. As part of the recvmsg operation, the processed | |
| * TX buffers are extracted from the TX SGL into a separate SGL. | |
| * | |
| * After the completion of the crypto operation, the RX SGL and the cipher | |
| * request is released. The extracted TX SGL parts are released together with | |
| * the RX SGL release. | |
| */ | |
| #include <crypto/internal/aead.h> | |
| #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> | |
| #include <crypto/if_alg.h> | |
| #include <linux/init.h> | |
| #include <linux/list.h> | |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| #include <linux/mm.h> | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/net.h> | |
| #include <net/sock.h> | |
| static const struct af_alg_allowlist_entry aead_allowlist[] = { | |
| { "ccm(aes)" }, /* bluez */ | |
| {}, | |
| }; | |
| static inline bool aead_sufficient_data(struct sock *sk) | |
| { | |
| struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); | |
| struct sock *psk = ask->parent; | |
| struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); | |
| struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private; | |
| unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); | |
| /* | |
| * The minimum amount of memory needed for an AEAD cipher is | |
| * the AAD and in case of decryption the tag. | |
| */ | |
| return ctx->used >= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? 0 : as); | |
| } | |
| static int aead_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) | |
| { | |
| struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
| struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); | |
| struct sock *psk = ask->parent; | |
| struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private; | |
| unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); | |
| return af_alg_sendmsg(sock, msg, size, ivsize); | |
| } | |
| static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
| size_t ignored, int flags) | |
| { | |
| struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
| struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); | |
| struct sock *psk = ask->parent; | |
| struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); | |
| struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private; | |
| unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); | |
| unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); | |
| struct af_alg_async_req *areq; | |
| struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src = NULL; | |
| void *iv; | |
| int err = 0; | |
| size_t used = 0; /* [in] TX bufs to be en/decrypted */ | |
| size_t outlen = 0; /* [out] RX bufs produced by kernel */ | |
| size_t usedpages = 0; /* [in] RX bufs to be used from user */ | |
| size_t processed = 0; /* [in] TX bufs to be consumed */ | |
| if (!ctx->init || ctx->more) { | |
| err = af_alg_wait_for_data(sk, flags, 0); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg that has not yet been | |
| * processed. | |
| */ | |
| used = ctx->used; | |
| /* | |
| * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is also | |
| * present in sendmsg. The checks in sendmsg shall provide an | |
| * information to the data sender that something is wrong, but they are | |
| * irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. We need this check | |
| * here too in case user space decides to not honor the error message | |
| * in sendmsg and still call recvmsg. This check here protects the | |
| * kernel integrity. | |
| */ | |
| if (!aead_sufficient_data(sk)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| /* | |
| * Calculate the minimum output buffer size holding the result of the | |
| * cipher operation. When encrypting data, the receiving buffer is | |
| * larger by the tag length compared to the input buffer as the | |
| * encryption operation generates the tag. For decryption, the input | |
| * buffer provides the tag which is consumed resulting in only the | |
| * plaintext without a buffer for the tag returned to the caller. | |
| */ | |
| if (ctx->enc) | |
| outlen = used + as; | |
| else | |
| outlen = used - as; | |
| /* | |
| * The cipher operation input data is reduced by the associated data | |
| * length as this data is processed separately later on. | |
| */ | |
| used -= ctx->aead_assoclen; | |
| /* Allocate cipher request for current operation. */ | |
| areq = af_alg_alloc_areq(sk, sizeof(struct af_alg_async_req) + | |
| crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm) + ivsize); | |
| if (IS_ERR(areq)) | |
| return PTR_ERR(areq); | |
| iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx(&areq->cra_u.aead_req) + | |
| crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); | |
| memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, ivsize); | |
| /* convert iovecs of output buffers into RX SGL */ | |
| err = af_alg_get_rsgl(sk, msg, flags, areq, outlen, &usedpages); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto free; | |
| /* | |
| * Ensure output buffer is sufficiently large. If the caller provides | |
| * less buffer space, only use the relative required input size. This | |
| * allows AIO operation where the caller sent all data to be processed | |
| * and the AIO operation performs the operation on the different chunks | |
| * of the input data. | |
| */ | |
| if (usedpages < outlen) { | |
| size_t less = outlen - usedpages; | |
| if (used < less + (ctx->enc ? 0 : as)) { | |
| err = -EINVAL; | |
| goto free; | |
| } | |
| used -= less; | |
| outlen -= less; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the | |
| * SG entries from the global TX SGL. | |
| */ | |
| processed = used + ctx->aead_assoclen; | |
| areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed); | |
| if (!areq->tsgl_entries) | |
| areq->tsgl_entries = 1; | |
| areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), | |
| areq->tsgl_entries), | |
| GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!areq->tsgl) { | |
| err = -ENOMEM; | |
| goto free; | |
| } | |
| sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); | |
| af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl); | |
| tsgl_src = areq->tsgl; | |
| /* | |
| * Copy of AAD from source to destination | |
| * | |
| * The AAD is copied to the destination buffer without change. Even | |
| * when user space uses an in-place cipher operation, the kernel | |
| * will copy the data as it does not see whether such in-place operation | |
| * is initiated. | |
| */ | |
| /* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */ | |
| rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl; | |
| memcpy_sglist(rsgl_src, tsgl_src, ctx->aead_assoclen); | |
| /* Initialize the crypto operation */ | |
| aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src, | |
| areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, iv); | |
| aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen); | |
| aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm); | |
| aead_request_set_callback(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, | |
| CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | | |
| CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, | |
| crypto_req_done, &ctx->wait); | |
| err = crypto_wait_req(ctx->enc ? | |
| crypto_aead_encrypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req) : | |
| crypto_aead_decrypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req), | |
| &ctx->wait); | |
| free: | |
| af_alg_free_resources(areq); | |
| return err ? err : outlen; | |
| } | |
| static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
| size_t ignored, int flags) | |
| { | |
| struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| lock_sock(sk); | |
| while (msg_data_left(msg)) { | |
| int err = _aead_recvmsg(sock, msg, ignored, flags); | |
| /* | |
| * This error covers -EIOCBQUEUED which implies that we can | |
| * only handle one AIO request. If the caller wants to have | |
| * multiple AIO requests in parallel, he must make multiple | |
| * separate AIO calls. | |
| * | |
| * Also return the error if no data has been processed so far. | |
| */ | |
| if (err <= 0) { | |
| if (err == -EIOCBQUEUED || err == -EBADMSG || !ret) | |
| ret = err; | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| ret += err; | |
| } | |
| out: | |
| af_alg_wmem_wakeup(sk); | |
| release_sock(sk); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static struct proto_ops algif_aead_ops = { | |
| .family = PF_ALG, | |
| .connect = sock_no_connect, | |
| .socketpair = sock_no_socketpair, | |
| .getname = sock_no_getname, | |
| .ioctl = sock_no_ioctl, | |
| .listen = sock_no_listen, | |
| .shutdown = sock_no_shutdown, | |
| .mmap = sock_no_mmap, | |
| .bind = sock_no_bind, | |
| .accept = sock_no_accept, | |
| .release = af_alg_release, | |
| .sendmsg = aead_sendmsg, | |
| .recvmsg = aead_recvmsg, | |
| .poll = af_alg_poll, | |
| }; | |
| static int aead_check_key(struct socket *sock) | |
| { | |
| int err = 0; | |
| struct sock *psk; | |
| struct alg_sock *pask; | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm; | |
| struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
| struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); | |
| lock_sock(sk); | |
| if (!atomic_read(&ask->nokey_refcnt)) | |
| goto unlock_child; | |
| psk = ask->parent; | |
| pask = alg_sk(ask->parent); | |
| tfm = pask->private; | |
| err = -ENOKEY; | |
| lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); | |
| if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY) | |
| goto unlock; | |
| atomic_dec(&pask->nokey_refcnt); | |
| atomic_set(&ask->nokey_refcnt, 0); | |
| err = 0; | |
| unlock: | |
| release_sock(psk); | |
| unlock_child: | |
| release_sock(sk); | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| static int aead_sendmsg_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
| size_t size) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| err = aead_check_key(sock); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| return aead_sendmsg(sock, msg, size); | |
| } | |
| static int aead_recvmsg_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
| size_t ignored, int flags) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| err = aead_check_key(sock); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| return aead_recvmsg(sock, msg, ignored, flags); | |
| } | |
| static struct proto_ops algif_aead_ops_nokey = { | |
| .family = PF_ALG, | |
| .connect = sock_no_connect, | |
| .socketpair = sock_no_socketpair, | |
| .getname = sock_no_getname, | |
| .ioctl = sock_no_ioctl, | |
| .listen = sock_no_listen, | |
| .shutdown = sock_no_shutdown, | |
| .mmap = sock_no_mmap, | |
| .bind = sock_no_bind, | |
| .accept = sock_no_accept, | |
| .release = af_alg_release, | |
| .sendmsg = aead_sendmsg_nokey, | |
| .recvmsg = aead_recvmsg_nokey, | |
| .poll = af_alg_poll, | |
| }; | |
| static void *aead_bind(const char *name) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| err = af_alg_check_restriction(name, aead_allowlist); | |
| if (err) | |
| return ERR_PTR(err); | |
| return crypto_alloc_aead(name, 0, AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK); | |
| } | |
| static void aead_release(void *private) | |
| { | |
| crypto_free_aead(private); | |
| } | |
| static int aead_setauthsize(void *private, unsigned int authsize) | |
| { | |
| return crypto_aead_setauthsize(private, authsize); | |
| } | |
| static int aead_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) | |
| { | |
| return crypto_aead_setkey(private, key, keylen); | |
| } | |
| static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) | |
| { | |
| struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); | |
| struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; | |
| struct sock *psk = ask->parent; | |
| struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private; | |
| unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); | |
| af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); | |
| sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, ivlen); | |
| sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); | |
| af_alg_release_parent(sk); | |
| } | |
| static int aead_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk) | |
| { | |
| struct af_alg_ctx *ctx; | |
| struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm = private; | |
| unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx); | |
| unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); | |
| ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!ctx) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| memset(ctx, 0, len); | |
| ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, ivlen, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!ctx->iv) { | |
| sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len); | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| } | |
| memset(ctx->iv, 0, ivlen); | |
| INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl_list); | |
| ctx->len = len; | |
| crypto_init_wait(&ctx->wait); | |
| ask->private = ctx; | |
| sk->sk_destruct = aead_sock_destruct; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk) | |
| { | |
| struct crypto_aead *tfm = private; | |
| if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| return aead_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk); | |
| } | |
| static const struct af_alg_type algif_type_aead = { | |
| .bind = aead_bind, | |
| .release = aead_release, | |
| .setkey = aead_setkey, | |
| .setauthsize = aead_setauthsize, | |
| .accept = aead_accept_parent, | |
| .accept_nokey = aead_accept_parent_nokey, | |
| .ops = &algif_aead_ops, | |
| .ops_nokey = &algif_aead_ops_nokey, | |
| .name = "aead", | |
| .owner = THIS_MODULE | |
| }; | |
| static int __init algif_aead_init(void) | |
| { | |
| return af_alg_register_type(&algif_type_aead); | |
| } | |
| static void __exit algif_aead_exit(void) | |
| { | |
| int err = af_alg_unregister_type(&algif_type_aead); | |
| BUG_ON(err); | |
| } | |
| module_init(algif_aead_init); | |
| module_exit(algif_aead_exit); | |
| MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | |
| MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>"); | |
| MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AEAD kernel crypto API user space interface"); |