| .. _list_rcu_doc: | |
| Using RCU to Protect Read-Mostly Linked Lists | |
| ============================================= | |
| One of the most common uses of RCU is protecting read-mostly linked lists | |
| (``struct list_head`` in list.h). One big advantage of this approach is | |
| that all of the required memory ordering is provided by the list macros. | |
| This document describes several list-based RCU use cases. | |
| When iterating a list while holding the rcu_read_lock(), writers may | |
| modify the list. The reader is guaranteed to see all of the elements | |
| which were added to the list before they acquired the rcu_read_lock() | |
| and are still on the list when they drop the rcu_read_unlock(). | |
| Elements which are added to, or removed from the list may or may not | |
| be seen. If the writer calls list_replace_rcu(), the reader may see | |
| either the old element or the new element; they will not see both, | |
| nor will they see neither. | |
| Example 1: Read-mostly list: Deferred Destruction | |
| ------------------------------------------------- | |
| A widely used usecase for RCU lists in the kernel is lockless iteration over | |
| all processes in the system. ``task_struct::tasks`` represents the list node that | |
| links all the processes. The list can be traversed in parallel to any list | |
| additions or removals. | |
| The traversal of the list is done using ``for_each_process()`` which is defined | |
| by the 2 macros:: | |
| #define next_task(p) \ | |
| list_entry_rcu((p)->tasks.next, struct task_struct, tasks) | |
| #define for_each_process(p) \ | |
| for (p = &init_task ; (p = next_task(p)) != &init_task ; ) | |
| The code traversing the list of all processes typically looks like:: | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| for_each_process(p) { | |
| /* Do something with p */ | |
| } | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| The simplified and heavily inlined code for removing a process from a | |
| task list is:: | |
| void release_task(struct task_struct *p) | |
| { | |
| write_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
| list_del_rcu(&p->tasks); | |
| write_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
| call_rcu(&p->rcu, delayed_put_task_struct); | |
| } | |
| When a process exits, ``release_task()`` calls ``list_del_rcu(&p->tasks)`` | |
| via __exit_signal() and __unhash_process() under ``tasklist_lock`` | |
| writer lock protection. The list_del_rcu() invocation removes | |
| the task from the list of all tasks. The ``tasklist_lock`` | |
| prevents concurrent list additions/removals from corrupting the | |
| list. Readers using ``for_each_process()`` are not protected with the | |
| ``tasklist_lock``. To prevent readers from noticing changes in the list | |
| pointers, the ``task_struct`` object is freed only after one or more | |
| grace periods elapse, with the help of call_rcu(), which is invoked via | |
| put_task_struct_rcu_user(). This deferring of destruction ensures that | |
| any readers traversing the list will see valid ``p->tasks.next`` pointers | |
| and deletion/freeing can happen in parallel with traversal of the list. | |
| This pattern is also called an **existence lock**, since RCU refrains | |
| from invoking the delayed_put_task_struct() callback function until | |
| all existing readers finish, which guarantees that the ``task_struct`` | |
| object in question will remain in existence until after the completion | |
| of all RCU readers that might possibly have a reference to that object. | |
| Example 2: Read-Side Action Taken Outside of Lock: No In-Place Updates | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Some reader-writer locking use cases compute a value while holding | |
| the read-side lock, but continue to use that value after that lock is | |
| released. These use cases are often good candidates for conversion | |
| to RCU. One prominent example involves network packet routing. | |
| Because the packet-routing data tracks the state of equipment outside | |
| of the computer, it will at times contain stale data. Therefore, once | |
| the route has been computed, there is no need to hold the routing table | |
| static during transmission of the packet. After all, you can hold the | |
| routing table static all you want, but that won't keep the external | |
| Internet from changing, and it is the state of the external Internet | |
| that really matters. In addition, routing entries are typically added | |
| or deleted, rather than being modified in place. This is a rare example | |
| of the finite speed of light and the non-zero size of atoms actually | |
| helping make synchronization be lighter weight. | |
| A straightforward example of this type of RCU use case may be found in | |
| the system-call auditing support. For example, a reader-writer locked | |
| implementation of ``audit_filter_task()`` might be as follows:: | |
| static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| enum audit_state state; | |
| read_lock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| /* Note: audit_filter_mutex held by caller. */ | |
| list_for_each_entry(e, &audit_tsklist, list) { | |
| if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { | |
| if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) | |
| *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
| read_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return state; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| read_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
| } | |
| Here the list is searched under the lock, but the lock is dropped before | |
| the corresponding value is returned. By the time that this value is acted | |
| on, the list may well have been modified. This makes sense, since if | |
| you are turning auditing off, it is OK to audit a few extra system calls. | |
| This means that RCU can be easily applied to the read side, as follows:: | |
| static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| enum audit_state state; | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| /* Note: audit_filter_mutex held by caller. */ | |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) { | |
| if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { | |
| if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) | |
| *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| return state; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
| } | |
| The read_lock() and read_unlock() calls have become rcu_read_lock() | |
| and rcu_read_unlock(), respectively, and the list_for_each_entry() | |
| has become list_for_each_entry_rcu(). The **_rcu()** list-traversal | |
| primitives add READ_ONCE() and diagnostic checks for incorrect use | |
| outside of an RCU read-side critical section. | |
| The changes to the update side are also straightforward. A reader-writer lock | |
| might be used as follows for deletion and insertion in these simplified | |
| versions of audit_del_rule() and audit_add_rule():: | |
| static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
| struct list_head *list) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| write_lock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
| if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
| list_del(&e->list); | |
| write_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| write_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
| } | |
| static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, | |
| struct list_head *list) | |
| { | |
| write_lock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) { | |
| entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND; | |
| list_add(&entry->list, list); | |
| } else { | |
| list_add_tail(&entry->list, list); | |
| } | |
| write_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| Following are the RCU equivalents for these two functions:: | |
| static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
| struct list_head *list) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| /* No need to use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
| * deletion routine. */ | |
| list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
| if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
| list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
| call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
| } | |
| static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, | |
| struct list_head *list) | |
| { | |
| if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) { | |
| entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND; | |
| list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
| } else { | |
| list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| Normally, the write_lock() and write_unlock() would be replaced by a | |
| spin_lock() and a spin_unlock(). But in this case, all callers hold | |
| ``audit_filter_mutex``, so no additional locking is required. The | |
| auditsc_lock can therefore be eliminated, since use of RCU eliminates the | |
| need for writers to exclude readers. | |
| The list_del(), list_add(), and list_add_tail() primitives have been | |
| replaced by list_del_rcu(), list_add_rcu(), and list_add_tail_rcu(). | |
| The **_rcu()** list-manipulation primitives add memory barriers that are | |
| needed on weakly ordered CPUs. The list_del_rcu() primitive omits the | |
| pointer poisoning debug-assist code that would otherwise cause concurrent | |
| readers to fail spectacularly. | |
| So, when readers can tolerate stale data and when entries are either added or | |
| deleted, without in-place modification, it is very easy to use RCU! | |
| Example 3: Handling In-Place Updates | |
| ------------------------------------ | |
| The system-call auditing code does not update auditing rules in place. However, | |
| if it did, the reader-writer-locked code to do so might look as follows | |
| (assuming only ``field_count`` is updated, otherwise, the added fields would | |
| need to be filled in):: | |
| static inline int audit_upd_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
| struct list_head *list, | |
| __u32 newaction, | |
| __u32 newfield_count) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| struct audit_entry *ne; | |
| write_lock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| /* Note: audit_filter_mutex held by caller. */ | |
| list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
| if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
| e->rule.action = newaction; | |
| e->rule.field_count = newfield_count; | |
| write_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| write_unlock(&auditsc_lock); | |
| return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
| } | |
| The RCU version creates a copy, updates the copy, then replaces the old | |
| entry with the newly updated entry. This sequence of actions, allowing | |
| concurrent reads while making a copy to perform an update, is what gives | |
| RCU (*read-copy update*) its name. | |
| The RCU version of audit_upd_rule() is as follows:: | |
| static inline int audit_upd_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
| struct list_head *list, | |
| __u32 newaction, | |
| __u32 newfield_count) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| struct audit_entry *ne; | |
| list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
| if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
| ne = kmalloc_obj(*entry, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
| if (ne == NULL) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| audit_copy_rule(&ne->rule, &e->rule); | |
| ne->rule.action = newaction; | |
| ne->rule.field_count = newfield_count; | |
| list_replace_rcu(&e->list, &ne->list); | |
| call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
| } | |
| Again, this assumes that the caller holds ``audit_filter_mutex``. Normally, the | |
| writer lock would become a spinlock in this sort of code. | |
| The update_lsm_rule() does something very similar, for those who would | |
| prefer to look at real Linux-kernel code. | |
| Another use of this pattern can be found in the openswitch driver's *connection | |
| tracking table* code in ``ct_limit_set()``. The table holds connection tracking | |
| entries and has a limit on the maximum entries. There is one such table | |
| per-zone and hence one *limit* per zone. The zones are mapped to their limits | |
| through a hashtable using an RCU-managed hlist for the hash chains. When a new | |
| limit is set, a new limit object is allocated and ``ct_limit_set()`` is called | |
| to replace the old limit object with the new one using list_replace_rcu(). | |
| The old limit object is then freed after a grace period using kfree_rcu(). | |
| Example 4: Eliminating Stale Data | |
| --------------------------------- | |
| The auditing example above tolerates stale data, as do most algorithms | |
| that are tracking external state. After all, given there is a delay | |
| from the time the external state changes before Linux becomes aware | |
| of the change, and so as noted earlier, a small quantity of additional | |
| RCU-induced staleness is generally not a problem. | |
| However, there are many examples where stale data cannot be tolerated. | |
| One example in the Linux kernel is the System V IPC (see the shm_lock() | |
| function in ipc/shm.c). This code checks a *deleted* flag under a | |
| per-entry spinlock, and, if the *deleted* flag is set, pretends that the | |
| entry does not exist. For this to be helpful, the search function must | |
| return holding the per-entry spinlock, as shm_lock() does in fact do. | |
| .. _quick_quiz: | |
| Quick Quiz: | |
| For the deleted-flag technique to be helpful, why is it necessary | |
| to hold the per-entry lock while returning from the search function? | |
| :ref:`Answer to Quick Quiz <quick_quiz_answer>` | |
| If the system-call audit module were to ever need to reject stale data, one way | |
| to accomplish this would be to add a ``deleted`` flag and a ``lock`` spinlock to the | |
| ``audit_entry`` structure, and modify audit_filter_task() as follows:: | |
| static struct audit_entry *audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| enum audit_state state; | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) { | |
| if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { | |
| spin_lock(&e->lock); | |
| if (e->deleted) { | |
| spin_unlock(&e->lock); | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) | |
| *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
| /* As long as e->lock is held, e is valid and | |
| * its value is not stale */ | |
| return e; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| The ``audit_del_rule()`` function would need to set the ``deleted`` flag under the | |
| spinlock as follows:: | |
| static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
| struct list_head *list) | |
| { | |
| struct audit_entry *e; | |
| /* No need to use the _rcu iterator here, since this | |
| * is the only deletion routine. */ | |
| list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
| if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
| spin_lock(&e->lock); | |
| list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
| e->deleted = 1; | |
| spin_unlock(&e->lock); | |
| call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
| } | |
| This too assumes that the caller holds ``audit_filter_mutex``. | |
| Note that this example assumes that entries are only added and deleted. | |
| Additional mechanism is required to deal correctly with the update-in-place | |
| performed by audit_upd_rule(). For one thing, audit_upd_rule() would | |
| need to hold the locks of both the old ``audit_entry`` and its replacement | |
| while executing the list_replace_rcu(). | |
| Example 5: Skipping Stale Objects | |
| --------------------------------- | |
| For some use cases, reader performance can be improved by skipping | |
| stale objects during read-side list traversal, where stale objects | |
| are those that will be removed and destroyed after one or more grace | |
| periods. One such example can be found in the timerfd subsystem. When a | |
| ``CLOCK_REALTIME`` clock is reprogrammed (for example due to setting | |
| of the system time) then all programmed ``timerfds`` that depend on | |
| this clock get triggered and processes waiting on them are awakened in | |
| advance of their scheduled expiry. To facilitate this, all such timers | |
| are added to an RCU-managed ``cancel_list`` when they are setup in | |
| ``timerfd_setup_cancel()``:: | |
| static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx, int flags) | |
| { | |
| spin_lock(&ctx->cancel_lock); | |
| if ((ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME || | |
| ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM) && | |
| (flags & TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME) && (flags & TFD_TIMER_CANCEL_ON_SET)) { | |
| if (!ctx->might_cancel) { | |
| ctx->might_cancel = true; | |
| spin_lock(&cancel_lock); | |
| list_add_rcu(&ctx->clist, &cancel_list); | |
| spin_unlock(&cancel_lock); | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| __timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx); | |
| } | |
| spin_unlock(&ctx->cancel_lock); | |
| } | |
| When a timerfd is freed (fd is closed), then the ``might_cancel`` | |
| flag of the timerfd object is cleared, the object removed from the | |
| ``cancel_list`` and destroyed, as shown in this simplified and inlined | |
| version of timerfd_release():: | |
| int timerfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) | |
| { | |
| struct timerfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; | |
| spin_lock(&ctx->cancel_lock); | |
| if (ctx->might_cancel) { | |
| ctx->might_cancel = false; | |
| spin_lock(&cancel_lock); | |
| list_del_rcu(&ctx->clist); | |
| spin_unlock(&cancel_lock); | |
| } | |
| spin_unlock(&ctx->cancel_lock); | |
| if (isalarm(ctx)) | |
| alarm_cancel(&ctx->t.alarm); | |
| else | |
| hrtimer_cancel(&ctx->t.tmr); | |
| kfree_rcu(ctx, rcu); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| If the ``CLOCK_REALTIME`` clock is set, for example by a time server, the | |
| hrtimer framework calls ``timerfd_clock_was_set()`` which walks the | |
| ``cancel_list`` and wakes up processes waiting on the timerfd. While iterating | |
| the ``cancel_list``, the ``might_cancel`` flag is consulted to skip stale | |
| objects:: | |
| void timerfd_clock_was_set(void) | |
| { | |
| ktime_t moffs = ktime_mono_to_real(0); | |
| struct timerfd_ctx *ctx; | |
| unsigned long flags; | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(ctx, &cancel_list, clist) { | |
| if (!ctx->might_cancel) | |
| continue; | |
| spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->wqh.lock, flags); | |
| if (ctx->moffs != moffs) { | |
| ctx->moffs = KTIME_MAX; | |
| ctx->ticks++; | |
| wake_up_locked_poll(&ctx->wqh, EPOLLIN); | |
| } | |
| spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->wqh.lock, flags); | |
| } | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| } | |
| The key point is that because RCU-protected traversal of the | |
| ``cancel_list`` happens concurrently with object addition and removal, | |
| sometimes the traversal can access an object that has been removed from | |
| the list. In this example, a flag is used to skip such objects. | |
| Summary | |
| ------- | |
| Read-mostly list-based data structures that can tolerate stale data are | |
| the most amenable to use of RCU. The simplest case is where entries are | |
| either added or deleted from the data structure (or atomically modified | |
| in place), but non-atomic in-place modifications can be handled by making | |
| a copy, updating the copy, then replacing the original with the copy. | |
| If stale data cannot be tolerated, then a *deleted* flag may be used | |
| in conjunction with a per-entry spinlock in order to allow the search | |
| function to reject newly deleted data. | |
| .. _quick_quiz_answer: | |
| Answer to Quick Quiz: | |
| For the deleted-flag technique to be helpful, why is it necessary | |
| to hold the per-entry lock while returning from the search function? | |
| If the search function drops the per-entry lock before returning, | |
| then the caller will be processing stale data in any case. If it | |
| is really OK to be processing stale data, then you don't need a | |
| *deleted* flag. If processing stale data really is a problem, | |
| then you need to hold the per-entry lock across all of the code | |
| that uses the value that was returned. | |
| :ref:`Back to Quick Quiz <quick_quiz>` |