| .. _securitybugs: | |
| Security bugs | |
| ============= | |
| Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd | |
| like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and | |
| disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the | |
| Linux kernel security team. | |
| Contact | |
| ------- | |
| The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at | |
| <security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers | |
| who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix. | |
| If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as | |
| that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the | |
| security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to | |
| understand and fix the security vulnerability. | |
| As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it | |
| will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in | |
| admin-guide/reporting-bugs.rst if you are unclear about what | |
| information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not | |
| be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been | |
| made public. | |
| Disclosure | |
| ---------- | |
| The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug | |
| submitter to understand and fix the bug. We prefer to publish the fix as | |
| soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself | |
| and leave that to others. | |
| Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet | |
| fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor | |
| coordination. However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in | |
| days, not weeks or months. A release date is negotiated by the security | |
| team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the | |
| kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe. The | |
| timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug) | |
| to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to | |
| release date to be on the order of 7 days. | |
| Coordination | |
| ------------ | |
| Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege | |
| escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private | |
| <linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors | |
| are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the | |
| upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and | |
| will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update | |
| publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, | |
| the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can | |
| include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix | |
| the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: | |
| <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists> | |
| CVE assignment | |
| -------------- | |
| The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them | |
| for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and | |
| may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier | |
| assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private | |
| linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known | |
| before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit | |
| message, though. | |
| Non-disclosure agreements | |
| ------------------------- | |
| The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable | |
| to enter any non-disclosure agreements. |