| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| /* | |
| * fs/crypto/hooks.c | |
| * | |
| * Encryption hooks for higher-level filesystem operations. | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/key.h> | |
| #include "fscrypt_private.h" | |
| /** | |
| * fscrypt_file_open() - prepare to open a possibly-encrypted regular file | |
| * @inode: the inode being opened | |
| * @filp: the struct file being set up | |
| * | |
| * Currently, an encrypted regular file can only be opened if its encryption key | |
| * is available; access to the raw encrypted contents is not supported. | |
| * Therefore, we first set up the inode's encryption key (if not already done) | |
| * and return an error if it's unavailable. | |
| * | |
| * We also verify that if the parent directory (from the path via which the file | |
| * is being opened) is encrypted, then the inode being opened uses the same | |
| * encryption policy. This is needed as part of the enforcement that all files | |
| * in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy, as a | |
| * protection against certain types of offline attacks. Note that this check is | |
| * needed even when opening an *unencrypted* file, since it's forbidden to have | |
| * an unencrypted file in an encrypted directory. | |
| * | |
| * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code | |
| */ | |
| int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| struct dentry *dir; | |
| err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| dir = dget_parent(file_dentry(filp)); | |
| if (IS_ENCRYPTED(d_inode(dir)) && | |
| !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(d_inode(dir), inode)) { | |
| fscrypt_warn(inode, | |
| "Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: %lu)", | |
| d_inode(dir)->i_ino); | |
| err = -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| dput(dir); | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open); | |
| int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, | |
| struct dentry *dentry) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| err = fscrypt_require_key(dir); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| /* ... in case we looked up ciphertext name before key was added */ | |
| if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode)) | |
| return -EXDEV; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_link); | |
| int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
| struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, | |
| unsigned int flags) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| err = fscrypt_require_key(old_dir); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| err = fscrypt_require_key(new_dir); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| /* ... in case we looked up ciphertext name(s) before key was added */ | |
| if ((old_dentry->d_flags | new_dentry->d_flags) & | |
| DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| if (old_dir != new_dir) { | |
| if (IS_ENCRYPTED(new_dir) && | |
| !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir, | |
| d_inode(old_dentry))) | |
| return -EXDEV; | |
| if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && | |
| IS_ENCRYPTED(old_dir) && | |
| !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(old_dir, | |
| d_inode(new_dentry))) | |
| return -EXDEV; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_rename); | |
| int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, | |
| struct fscrypt_name *fname) | |
| { | |
| int err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, fname); | |
| if (err && err != -ENOENT) | |
| return err; | |
| if (fname->is_ciphertext_name) { | |
| spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); | |
| dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME; | |
| spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); | |
| d_set_d_op(dentry, &fscrypt_d_ops); | |
| } | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup); | |
| /** | |
| * fscrypt_prepare_setflags() - prepare to change flags with FS_IOC_SETFLAGS | |
| * @inode: the inode on which flags are being changed | |
| * @oldflags: the old flags | |
| * @flags: the new flags | |
| * | |
| * The caller should be holding i_rwsem for write. | |
| * | |
| * Return: 0 on success; -errno if the flags change isn't allowed or if | |
| * another error occurs. | |
| */ | |
| int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, | |
| unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags) | |
| { | |
| struct fscrypt_info *ci; | |
| struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; | |
| int err; | |
| /* | |
| * When the CASEFOLD flag is set on an encrypted directory, we must | |
| * derive the secret key needed for the dirhash. This is only possible | |
| * if the directory uses a v2 encryption policy. | |
| */ | |
| if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && (flags & ~oldflags & FS_CASEFOLD_FL)) { | |
| err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| ci = inode->i_crypt_info; | |
| if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0]; | |
| down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); | |
| if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) | |
| err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk); | |
| else | |
| err = -ENOKEY; | |
| up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int len, | |
| unsigned int max_len, | |
| struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| /* | |
| * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know | |
| * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in | |
| * the encryption policy which will be inherited from the directory. | |
| * The easiest way to get access to this is to just load the directory's | |
| * fscrypt_info, since we'll need it to create the dir_entry anyway. | |
| * | |
| * Note: in test_dummy_encryption mode, @dir may be unencrypted. | |
| */ | |
| err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) | |
| return -ENOKEY; | |
| /* | |
| * Calculate the size of the encrypted symlink and verify it won't | |
| * exceed max_len. Note that for historical reasons, encrypted symlink | |
| * targets are prefixed with the ciphertext length, despite this | |
| * actually being redundant with i_size. This decreases by 2 bytes the | |
| * longest symlink target we can accept. | |
| * | |
| * We could recover 1 byte by not counting a null terminator, but | |
| * counting it (even though it is meaningless for ciphertext) is simpler | |
| * for now since filesystems will assume it is there and subtract it. | |
| */ | |
| if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, len, | |
| max_len - sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data), | |
| &disk_link->len)) | |
| return -ENAMETOOLONG; | |
| disk_link->len += sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data); | |
| disk_link->name = NULL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_symlink); | |
| int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target, | |
| unsigned int len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| struct qstr iname = QSTR_INIT(target, len); | |
| struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd; | |
| unsigned int ciphertext_len; | |
| err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| if (disk_link->name) { | |
| /* filesystem-provided buffer */ | |
| sd = (struct fscrypt_symlink_data *)disk_link->name; | |
| } else { | |
| sd = kmalloc(disk_link->len, GFP_NOFS); | |
| if (!sd) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| } | |
| ciphertext_len = disk_link->len - sizeof(*sd); | |
| sd->len = cpu_to_le16(ciphertext_len); | |
| err = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(inode, &iname, sd->encrypted_path, | |
| ciphertext_len); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto err_free_sd; | |
| /* | |
| * Null-terminating the ciphertext doesn't make sense, but we still | |
| * count the null terminator in the length, so we might as well | |
| * initialize it just in case the filesystem writes it out. | |
| */ | |
| sd->encrypted_path[ciphertext_len] = '\0'; | |
| /* Cache the plaintext symlink target for later use by get_link() */ | |
| err = -ENOMEM; | |
| inode->i_link = kmemdup(target, len + 1, GFP_NOFS); | |
| if (!inode->i_link) | |
| goto err_free_sd; | |
| if (!disk_link->name) | |
| disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)sd; | |
| return 0; | |
| err_free_sd: | |
| if (!disk_link->name) | |
| kfree(sd); | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_encrypt_symlink); | |
| /** | |
| * fscrypt_get_symlink() - get the target of an encrypted symlink | |
| * @inode: the symlink inode | |
| * @caddr: the on-disk contents of the symlink | |
| * @max_size: size of @caddr buffer | |
| * @done: if successful, will be set up to free the returned target if needed | |
| * | |
| * If the symlink's encryption key is available, we decrypt its target. | |
| * Otherwise, we encode its target for presentation. | |
| * | |
| * This may sleep, so the filesystem must have dropped out of RCU mode already. | |
| * | |
| * Return: the presentable symlink target or an ERR_PTR() | |
| */ | |
| const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr, | |
| unsigned int max_size, | |
| struct delayed_call *done) | |
| { | |
| const struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd; | |
| struct fscrypt_str cstr, pstr; | |
| bool has_key; | |
| int err; | |
| /* This is for encrypted symlinks only */ | |
| if (WARN_ON(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | |
| /* If the decrypted target is already cached, just return it. */ | |
| pstr.name = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link); | |
| if (pstr.name) | |
| return pstr.name; | |
| /* | |
| * Try to set up the symlink's encryption key, but we can continue | |
| * regardless of whether the key is available or not. | |
| */ | |
| err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode); | |
| if (err) | |
| return ERR_PTR(err); | |
| has_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode); | |
| /* | |
| * For historical reasons, encrypted symlink targets are prefixed with | |
| * the ciphertext length, even though this is redundant with i_size. | |
| */ | |
| if (max_size < sizeof(*sd)) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN); | |
| sd = caddr; | |
| cstr.name = (unsigned char *)sd->encrypted_path; | |
| cstr.len = le16_to_cpu(sd->len); | |
| if (cstr.len == 0) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN); | |
| if (cstr.len + sizeof(*sd) - 1 > max_size) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN); | |
| err = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(inode, cstr.len, &pstr); | |
| if (err) | |
| return ERR_PTR(err); | |
| err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, 0, 0, &cstr, &pstr); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto err_kfree; | |
| err = -EUCLEAN; | |
| if (pstr.name[0] == '\0') | |
| goto err_kfree; | |
| pstr.name[pstr.len] = '\0'; | |
| /* | |
| * Cache decrypted symlink targets in i_link for later use. Don't cache | |
| * symlink targets encoded without the key, since those become outdated | |
| * once the key is added. This pairs with the READ_ONCE() above and in | |
| * the VFS path lookup code. | |
| */ | |
| if (!has_key || | |
| cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_link, NULL, pstr.name) != NULL) | |
| set_delayed_call(done, kfree_link, pstr.name); | |
| return pstr.name; | |
| err_kfree: | |
| kfree(pstr.name); | |
| return ERR_PTR(err); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_get_symlink); |