| # IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture | |
| # | |
| config IMA | |
| bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" | |
| select SECURITYFS | |
| select CRYPTO | |
| select CRYPTO_HMAC | |
| select CRYPTO_MD5 | |
| select CRYPTO_SHA1 | |
| select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO | |
| select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML | |
| select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 | |
| select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI | |
| select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES | |
| help | |
| The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity | |
| Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash | |
| values of executables and other sensitive system files, | |
| as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages | |
| to change the contents of an important system file | |
| being measured, we can tell. | |
| If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains | |
| an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the | |
| TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party | |
| whether or not critical system files have been modified. | |
| Read <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html> | |
| to learn more about IMA. | |
| If unsure, say N. | |
| config IMA_KEXEC | |
| bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft boot" | |
| depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate | |
| a TPM's quote after a soft boot, the IMA measurement list of the | |
| running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. | |
| Depending on the IMA policy, the measurement list can grow to | |
| be very large. | |
| config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX | |
| int | |
| depends on IMA | |
| range 8 14 | |
| default 10 | |
| help | |
| IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index | |
| that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the | |
| measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. | |
| config IMA_LSM_RULES | |
| bool | |
| depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK) | |
| default y | |
| help | |
| Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. | |
| choice | |
| prompt "Default template" | |
| default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE | |
| depends on IMA | |
| help | |
| Select the default IMA measurement template. | |
| The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a | |
| hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, | |
| limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list | |
| template permits both larger hash digests and longer | |
| pathnames. | |
| config IMA_TEMPLATE | |
| bool "ima" | |
| config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE | |
| bool "ima-ng (default)" | |
| config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE | |
| bool "ima-sig" | |
| endchoice | |
| config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE | |
| string | |
| depends on IMA | |
| default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE | |
| default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE | |
| default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE | |
| choice | |
| prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm" | |
| default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 | |
| depends on IMA | |
| help | |
| Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement | |
| list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default | |
| hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command | |
| line 'ima_hash=' option. | |
| config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 | |
| bool "SHA1 (default)" | |
| depends on CRYPTO_SHA1=y | |
| config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 | |
| bool "SHA256" | |
| depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE | |
| config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 | |
| bool "SHA512" | |
| depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE | |
| config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 | |
| bool "WP512" | |
| depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE | |
| endchoice | |
| config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH | |
| string | |
| depends on IMA | |
| default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 | |
| default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 | |
| default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 | |
| default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 | |
| config IMA_WRITE_POLICY | |
| bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy" | |
| depends on IMA | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| IMA policy can now be updated multiple times. The new rules get | |
| appended to the original policy. Have in mind that the rules are | |
| scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones. | |
| If unsure, say N. | |
| config IMA_READ_POLICY | |
| bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy" | |
| depends on IMA | |
| default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY | |
| default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY | |
| help | |
| It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is | |
| even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. | |
| This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. | |
| config IMA_APPRAISE | |
| bool "Appraise integrity measurements" | |
| depends on IMA | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal. | |
| It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended | |
| attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect | |
| the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable | |
| and configure EVM. | |
| For more information on integrity appraisal refer to: | |
| <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> | |
| If unsure, say N. | |
| config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM | |
| bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" | |
| depends on IMA_APPRAISE | |
| default y | |
| help | |
| This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes | |
| (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line. | |
| config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" | |
| depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS | |
| select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| default y | |
| help | |
| This option requires that all keys added to the .ima | |
| keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. | |
| This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY | |
| bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)" | |
| depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS | |
| select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the | |
| key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or | |
| secondary trusted keyrings. | |
| Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the | |
| IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring, | |
| provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the | |
| built-in or secondary trusted keyrings. | |
| config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING | |
| bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)" | |
| depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all | |
| revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If | |
| the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and | |
| an error is returned to the caller. | |
| config IMA_LOAD_X509 | |
| bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring" | |
| depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| File signature verification is based on the public keys | |
| loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are | |
| X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the | |
| .system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate | |
| loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring. | |
| config IMA_X509_PATH | |
| string "IMA X509 certificate path" | |
| depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 | |
| default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der" | |
| help | |
| This option defines IMA X509 certificate path. | |
| config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT | |
| bool "Require signed user-space initialization" | |
| depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 | |
| default n | |
| help | |
| This option requires user-space init to be signed. |