==========================
Trusted and Encrypted Keys
==========================

Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel
key ring service.  Both of these new types are variable length symmetric keys,
and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees,
stores, and loads only encrypted blobs.  Trusted Keys require the availability
of a Trust Source for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any
system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ASCII for
convenience, and are integrity verified.

Trusted Keys as Protected key
=============================
It is the secure way of keeping the keys in the kernel key-ring as Trusted-Key,
such that:

- Key-blob, an encrypted key-data, created to be stored, loaded and seen by
  userspace.
- Key-data, the plain-key text in the system memory, to be used by
  kernel space only.

Though key-data is not accessible to the user-space in plain-text, but it is in
plain-text in system memory, when used in kernel space. Even though kernel-space
attracts small surface attack, but with compromised kernel or side-channel
attack accessing the system memory can lead to a chance of the key getting
compromised/leaked.

In order to protect the key in kernel space, the concept of "protected-keys" is
introduced which will act as an added layer of protection. The key-data of the
protected keys is encrypted with Key-Encryption-Key(KEK), and decrypted inside
the trust source boundary. The plain-key text never available out-side in the
system memory. Thus, any crypto operation that is to be executed using the
protected key, can only be done by the trust source, which generated the
key blob.

Hence, if the protected-key is leaked or compromised, it is of no use to the
hacker.

Trusted keys as protected keys, with trust source having the capability of
generating:

- Key-Blob, to be loaded, stored and seen by user-space.

Trust Source
============

A trust source provides the source of security for Trusted Keys.  This
section lists currently supported trust sources, along with their security
considerations.  Whether or not a trust source is sufficiently safe depends
on the strength and correctness of its implementation, as well as the threat
environment for a specific use case.  Since the kernel doesn't know what the
environment is, and there is no metric of trust, it is dependent on the
consumer of the Trusted Keys to determine if the trust source is sufficiently
safe.

  *  Root of trust for storage

     (1) TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device)

         Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that
         provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage.

     (2) TEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone)

         Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
         fuses and is accessible to TEE only.

     (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)

         When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
         mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
         randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
         Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.

     (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

         Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
         in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
         DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
         and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
         the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).

     (5) PKWM (PowerVM Key Wrapping Module: IBM PowerVM + Platform KeyStore)

         Rooted to a unique, per-LPAR key, which is derived from a system-wide,
         randomly generated LPAR root key. Both the per-LPAR keys and the LPAR
         root key are stored in hypervisor-owned secure memory at runtime,
         and the LPAR root key is additionally persisted in secure locations
         such as the processor SEEPROMs and encrypted NVRAM.

  *  Execution isolation

     (1) TPM

         Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.

     (2) TEE

         Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
         environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.

     (3) CAAM

         Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.

     (4) DCP

         Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
         environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
         The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.

     (5) PKWM (PowerVM Key Wrapping Module: IBM PowerVM + Platform KeyStore)

         Fixed set of cryptographic operations done on on-chip hardware
         cryptographic acceleration unit NX. Keys for wrapping and unwrapping
         are managed by PowerVM Platform KeyStore, which stores keys in an
         isolated in-memory copy in secure hypervisor memory, as well as in a
         persistent copy in hypervisor-encrypted NVRAM.

  * Optional binding to platform integrity state

     (1) TPM

         Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement)
         values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity
         verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
         (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values,
         such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can
         have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
         easily supported.

     (2) TEE

         Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
         be extended with TEE based measured boot process.

     (3) CAAM

         Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
         for platform integrity.

     (4) DCP

         Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
         platform integrity.

     (5) PKWM (PowerVM Key Wrapping Module: IBM PowerVM + Platform KeyStore)

         Relies on secure and trusted boot process of IBM Power systems for
         platform integrity.

  *  Interfaces and APIs

     (1) TPM

         TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs.

     (2) TEE

         TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
         more details refer to ``Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst``.

     (3) CAAM

         Interface is specific to silicon vendor.

     (4) DCP

         Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
         ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.

     (5) PKWM (PowerVM Key Wrapping Module: IBM PowerVM + Platform KeyStore)

         Platform Keystore has well documented interfaces in PAPR document.
         Refer to ``Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst``

  *  Threat model

     The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
     purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.


Key Generation
==============

Trusted Keys
------------

New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using
a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the
child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the
trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the
selected trust source:

  *  TPM: hardware device based RNG

     Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
     from one device manufacturer to another.

  *  TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG

     RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
     from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
     which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.

  *  CAAM: Kernel RNG

     The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
     CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
     is probed.

  *  DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)

     The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
     so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
     a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
     to back the kernel RNG.

   * PKWM (PowerVM Key Wrapping Module: IBM PowerVM + Platform KeyStore)

     The normal kernel random number generator is used to generate keys.

Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.

Encrypted Keys
--------------

Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or
user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
possible, preferably early in boot.


Usage
=====

Trusted Keys usage: TPM
-----------------------

TPM 1.2: By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the
default authorization value (20 bytes of 0s).  This can be set at takeownership
time with the TrouSerS utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z".

TPM 2.0: The user must first create a storage key and make it persistent, so the
key is available after reboot. This can be done using the following commands.

With the IBM TSS 2 stack::

  #> tsscreateprimary -hi o -st
  Handle 80000000
  #> tssevictcontrol -hi o -ho 80000000 -hp 81000001

Or with the Intel TSS 2 stack::

  #> tpm2_createprimary --hierarchy o -G rsa2048 -c key.ctxt
  [...]
  #> tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctxt 0x81000001
  persistentHandle: 0x81000001

Usage::

    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
    keyctl update key "update [options]"
    keyctl print keyid

    options:
       keyhandle=    ascii hex value of sealing key
                       TPM 1.2: default 0x40000000 (SRK)
                       TPM 2.0: no default; must be passed every time
       keyauth=	     ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
                     (40 ascii zeros)
       blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
                     (40 ascii zeros)
       pcrinfo=	     ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
       pcrlock=	     pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
       migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
                     default 1 (resealing allowed)
       hash=         hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only
                     allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values
                     are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256.
       policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated
                     with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash='
                     option.
       policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
                     same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
                     seal the key.

"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
TPM_STORED_DATA format.  The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit
within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding.

Trusted Keys usage: TEE
-----------------------

Usage::

    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
    keyctl print keyid

"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to TEE device implementation.  The key length for new keys is always
in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).

Trusted Keys usage: CAAM
------------------------

Trusted Keys Usage::

    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
    keyctl print keyid

"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
CAAM-specific format.  The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).

Trusted Keys as Protected Keys Usage::

    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen pk [options]" ring
    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [options]" ring
    keyctl print keyid

    where, 'pk' is used to direct trust source to generate protected key.

    options:
       key_enc_algo =      For CAAM, supported enc algo are ECB(2), CCM(1).

"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
CAAM-specific format.  The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).

Trusted Keys usage: DCP
-----------------------

Usage::

    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
    keyctl print keyid

"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to this DCP key-blob implementation.  The key length for new keys is
always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).

Trusted Keys usage: PKWM
------------------------

Usage::

    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
    keyctl print keyid

    options:
       wrap_flags=   ascii hex value of security policy requirement
                       0x00: no secure boot requirement (default)
                       0x01: require secure boot to be in either audit or
                             enforced mode
                       0x02: require secure boot to be in enforced mode

"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to PKWM key-blob implementation.  The key length for new keys is
always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).

Encrypted Keys usage
--------------------

The decrypted portion of encrypted keys can contain either a simple symmetric
key or a more complex structure. The format of the more complex structure is
application specific, which is identified by 'format'.

Usage::

    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
        ring
    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
        decrypted-data" ring
    keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
    keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"

Where::

	format:= 'default | ecryptfs | enc32'
	key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user'

Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage
-------------------------------------------

Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes.

Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle 0x81000001,
append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements between quotes, such as
"new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001".

::

    $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
    440502848

    $ keyctl show
    Session Keyring
           -3 --alswrv    500   500  keyring: _ses
     97833714 --alswrv    500    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.500
    440502848 --alswrv    500   500       \_ trusted: kmk

    $ keyctl print 440502848
    0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
    3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
    27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
    a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
    d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
    dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
    f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
    e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba

    $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob

Load a trusted key from the saved blob::

    $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u
    268728824

    $ keyctl print 268728824
    0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
    3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
    27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
    a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
    d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
    dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
    f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
    e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba

Create and save a trusted key as protected key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes.

::

    $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 pk key_enc_algo=1" @u
    440502848

    $ keyctl show
    Session Keyring
           -3 --alswrv    500   500  keyring: _ses
     97833714 --alswrv    500    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.500
    440502848 --alswrv    500   500       \_ trusted: kmk

    $ keyctl print 440502848
    0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
    3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
    27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
    a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
    d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
    dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
    f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
    e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba

    $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob

Load a trusted key from the saved blob::

    $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob` key_enc_algo=1" @u
    268728824

    $ keyctl print 268728824
    0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
    3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
    27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
    a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
    d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
    dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
    f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
    e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba

Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values::

    $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
    $ keyctl print 268728824
    010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805
    77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73
    d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e
    df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4
    9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6
    e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610
    94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9
    7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef
    df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8


The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high
quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a
trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been
compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to a platform integrity
state, protects against boot and offline attacks. Create and save an
encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk":

option 1: omitting 'format'::

    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u
    159771175

option 2: explicitly defining 'format' as 'default'::

    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u
    159771175

    $ keyctl print 159771175
    default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
    82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
    24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

    $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob

Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::

    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u
    831684262

    $ keyctl print 831684262
    default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3
    82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
    24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::

    $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p)
    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u
    794890253

    $ keyctl print 794890253
    default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
    bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
    17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
about the usage can be found in the file
``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``.

Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys
with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security
but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload.


TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format
------------------------

The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable,
even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1
format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and
policy::

    TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
        type		OBJECT IDENTIFIER
        emptyAuth	[0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
        parent		INTEGER
        pubkey		OCTET STRING
        privkey		OCTET STRING
    }

type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID
is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable
binary pattern at offset 3 in the key.  The OIDs currently made
available are::

    2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key.  This is an asymmetric key (Usually
                    RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
                    TPM2_Load() operation.

    2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key.  This is an asymmetric key (Usually
                    RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
                    TPM2_Import() operation.

    2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data.  This is a set of data (up to 128
                    bytes) which is sealed by the TPM.  It usually
                    represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before
                    use.

The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID.

emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "".  If it
is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization
phrase.  This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether
to prompt for a password.

parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space,
like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key.  Userspace programmes
also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space.  If
this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the
TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile
object and used as the parent.  The current kernel code only supports
the 0x81 MSO form.

pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the
initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet
string length.

privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
string length.

DCP Blob Format
---------------

.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
   :doc: dcp blob format

.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
   :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt